






“The Solution to Poor Opinions is More Opinions”: Peircean Pragmatist Tactics for the Epistemic Long Game
Catherine Legg, Deakin University
Introduction
Certain recent developments in mendacious manipulation of public discourse seem horrifying to the academic mind. The term post-truth newly describes a climate where, as defined by (no less than) the Oxford Dictionary, “objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (OED 2016). In such a context, strong opinion is considered to be worth more than facts, precisely due to its (apparent) strength. Allegedly, humanity is experiencing, “a crash in the value of truth, comparable to the collapse of a currency or a stock” (d’Ancona 2017).
Should we panic at having reached a new epistemic low in human history? Is truth disappearing from human culture and public life, never to return? And if so, what should we do about it? In this paper I will first suggest that these are long-standing tendencies in human history, so there is no need to panic at the present time. Next I will note that we might expect aid with these problems from philosophers, given their self-professed love of wisdom (or as it is more often put these days, “critical thinking”). The relevant branch of philosophy would seem to be epistemology, which sets itself the task of studying belief, truth and knowledge. But I shall argue that it is difficult to “make ends meet” between mainstream epistemology and the raft of problems falling under the heading “post-truth”, so such problems constitute a profound philosophical challenge to business as usual in that discipline.
By contrast, I argue that one epistemology is able to help us understand these troubling developments: the pragmatist philosophy of Charles Peirce. Unlike epistemologies in the analytic philosophical tradition, which largely organize around the study of knowledge, understood as some kind of idealised end-point of human thought, Peirce’s epistemology focusses on inquiry, understood as the process of “fixing belief”. This focus enables useful questions to be raised, such as: How can we make that process more effective? Peirce’s famous paper “The Fixation of Belief” is directed at precisely this question. It presents a taxonomy of four methods for fixing belief: tenacity, authority, a priori reasoning and science. In the last of these, the four methods culminate in a definition of truth in terms of the specific actions of a “community of inquiry”, which gives the definition real practical heft. In the order stated, this taxonomy of methods charts an evolutionary arc through human thought, from the least to the most logically sophisticated and effective method of eliminating doubt. Peirce does note, however, that at any given point in time all four methods can be observed in practice, as they also identify basic human personality types. He also warns that our general culture has a tendency to slip backwards from time to time in its evolutionary development. These claims will be further explored in ways that throw light on our current politico-intellectual climate. 
Finally, I will draw on Peirce’s philosophy to suggest certain “pragmatic” strategies (and corresponding responsibilities on the part of us educators) for weathering the “epistemic storms” that Western culture would currently appear to be experiencing. For not just presenting how things are, but suggesting what we can and should do about them – is the distinguishing goal of pragmatist philosophy.
A New “Post-Truth Regime”?
The term post-truth was apparently first coined in 1992 in discussion by Steve Tesich in the Nation of reactions to political scandals such as Watergate and Iran-Contra by the American people. He writes:
All the dictators up to now have had to work hard at suppressing the truth. We, by our actions, are saying that this is no longer necessary [… ] In a very fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world.
Here Tesich signals a shift in political distortion of the truth, from the traditional active suppression of important information by political leaders to apparent problems in accepting important information in ordinary people. (As such it offers an interesting challenge to the American pragmatist philosophy that informs this paper, insofar as its Deweyan strand places great faith in democratic processes emerging naturally in all problem-solving contexts. But we shall see that the Peircean strand of American pragmatism provides a considerably more complex analysis of “group inference”.) 
However it is just in the past 2 to 3 years that discussion of, and concern with, the post-truth concept has exploded. In 2015, media and politics scholar Jayson Harsin influentially launched the term regime of post-truth to encompass many aspects of contemporary politics. Harsin deliberately chose the term “regime” to signal that this epistemic turn is newly systematic, unlike past lying such as Watergate, however egregious and far-reaching its impact may have been. This systematicity has a number of dimensions. Harsin points to ways in which politically motivated agents now use cognitive science, micro-targeting, and other sophisticated manipulations (often drawing on Big Data) to influence the emotions and motivations of ordinary people, and to coarsen and thereby control public debate and opinion. It seems that to the extent to which we now live in an attention economy, the full force of human acquisitive ingenuity has been unleashed on “hacking” this new source of value, to the point where, as Matthew Crawford has astutely observed, one is assailed by advertisements even when putting one’s shoes in the crate to go through an airport scanner, and at slot machine manufacturing conferences experts boast of being able to manipulate their users to “play to extinction” (Crawford 2016). 
The regime also manifests remarkably in a deliberate, continued repetition of talking-points even when they have been clearly rebutted by easily verifiable facts. Consumers of the talking-points are often even aware that these rebuttals exist, but don’t seem to care. The government of US President Donald Trump has engaged particularly blatantly in such behavior; infamously, Trump’s inauguration crowd was described by White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer as “the largest audience ever to witness an inauguration” in the entire world, and when it was put to the White House that President Barack Obama’s crowd was far larger (a question easily resolvable by inspecting photos of both events,) staffer Kellyanne Conway notoriously remarked that the Press Secretary didn’t lie but merely offered “alternative facts”. Astoundingly, according to the respected fact-checking website Politi-Fact (http://www.politifact.com), fully 69 percent of Trump’s public statements are “Mostly False”, “False” or “Pants on Fire”. 
To many professional intellectuals such behaviour seems maddeningly immoral. Philosopher A.C. Grayling has warned of the “corruption of intellectual integrity” and damage to “the whole fabric of democracy” inherent in such developments. He blames growing economic inequality for inflaming many people’s anger to the point where they care little for reasoned argument. He also blames the rise of social media for making it too easy to publish, so that “a few claims on Twitter can have the same credibility as a library full of research” (Coughlan, 2017), and the role of society-wide trusted authorities to distinguish between truth and lies dwindles to the point where the authorities themselves become fewer. Paradoxically, at the same time, new social media enable people to much more aggressively filter what they consume, to the point where they avoid encountering any viewpoints or arguments that contradict their own. This has effectively produced a slew of parallel media ecosystems, organised around a landscape of incompatible naive opinions. Finally, the information overload created by the vastness of the system (even within a particular preferred ideological position) encourages a degraded forcing of attention in so-called “clickbait” headlines on any number of highly popular websites such as Buzzfeed, many of which are eyewateringly preposterous. As noted above, these headlines often grab attention by playing on people’s emotions in vivid ways (regarding which, new “dark arts” are developing in certain professional contexts). 
Although the ivory tower remains (in my opinion) relatively sheltered from the regime, it has nonetheless been felt there in ominous ways. More and more “junk” publications are appearing in fraudulent journals and conferences that masquerade as “genuinely academic” (Culley 2017) – more significantly, the very line between genuinely academic and junk publications seems to need renewed definition and defense. The past 5 years or so has seen an alarming rise in flagrant bullying of academics who work on politically and ethically sensitive issues (such as gender and race) spilling across the social media interfaces which many academics have been encouraged by their institutions (and themselves sought) to cultivate.​[1]​ Cuts to university-funding, combined with newly confident metrics of control by many governments of how the remaining money is spent in order to target so-called “outcomes”, have also produced a number of effects that are arguably demoralizing for the research profession. A “crisis of peer review” is developing as the burdens of the refereeing gift economy become unmanageable for ever more time-poor academics. In the empirical sciences, there is a “reproducibility crisis” as no-one has the time merely to repeat another researcher’s experiments, and it is career suicide to publish “negative results”. As university funding for pure research is undermined, industry-sponsored research moves in, which is increasingly biasing results in key areas such as biomedical research (Edmond 2008), and seeking to block government action in, for instance, public health initiatives and climate change remediation.
Meanwhile the academy’s very notion of “expert” opinion seems to be increasingly treated with distrust and disdain by wider society. A key leader of Britain’s recent campaign to leave the European Union (Justice Secretary Michael Gove) famously declared, “people in this country have had enough of experts!” (Mance 2016). This comment viewed by many not as a scandal but rather as a trenchant observation. As D’Ancona (2017, p. 2) writes, “The notion of science as a conspiracy rather than a world-changing field of inquiry used to be confined to cranks. No longer. It seems to me intolerable that this should be so.” 
It is worth considering that at least some of the apparent decay in academic mores described above may have been developing for some time. For instance, back in 1996, philosopher Susan Haack diagnosed a growing “preposterism” in our profession whereby “incentives and rewards encourage people to choose trivial issues where results are more easily obtained, to disguise rather than tackle problems with their chosen approach, to go for the flashy, the fashionable, and the impressively obscure over the deep, the difficult and the painfully clear”, and where, “the effective availability of the best and most significant work is hindered rather than enabled by journals and conferences bloated with the trivial, the faddy, and the carelessly or deliberately unclear”, and, “mutual scrutiny is impeded by fad, fashion, obfuscation, and fear of offending the influential.” (Haack, p. 191-192). 15 years later, Haack reprised this discussion, concluding that the situation had become even worse. In her estimation, scholars pursuing research with ethical conduct appropriate to the task are now likely to find themselves seriously at odds with their employer (Haack 2012). And criticisms can be found going much further back than that (e.g. Anderson 1935).
Are these Developments Unprecedented?
All of this is of course deeply worrying to me as a philosopher and a professional educator, and I believe that we should treat these problems with the utmost seriousness. In order to do this, we first need to understand them clearly. In this regard, I think it’s worth noting the way in which the academic-theoretical mind is geared for criticism, perfectionism. In my view, this makes us prone to a particular cognitive bias towards the view that “the sky is falling” and things of great value are about to be ruined irrevocably. Yet is this the first time in human history that a great many ordinary people have shown flagrant disregard for evidence or the opinions of thinking people? It is very sobering to examine the relationship between power and truth in the ancient world, which was considerably less constrained by the rule of law than contemporary Western society (for all the latter’s failings). For instance, a number of vignettes in the Stoic philosophy of Epictetus instruct the reader how to approach a tyrant who cares for no higher value than imposing his own will. Such an encounter can turn deadly at any moment for the independent thinker, yet Epictetus argues that this does not leave the philosopher with no choices:
[…] it is a man's own opinions which disturb him: for when the tyrant says to a man, “I will chain your leg,” he who values his leg says, “Do not; have pity:” but he who values his own will says, “If it appears more advantageous to you, chain it.” Do you not care? I do not care. I will show you that I am master. You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free: do you think that he intended to allow his own son to be enslaved? But you are master of my carcass: take it […] (Epictetus, 1.19)
More recent examples of power abusing truth (or the search for it) abound: the medieval Catholic Church’s burning of “heretics”; the behavior of Italian city-rulers as described by Machiavelli in The Prince; the fascism of Hitler; the communism of Stalin and Mao. Therefore we will not panic, but we will nevertheless begin to look for solutions that are continuous with the past, whilst acknowledging that today’s technologically-enhanced epistemic situation offers some new twists.
Why Mainstream Epistemology Arguably Cannot Help Us.
Consider the first few lines of the entry “Epistemology” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a deeply respected source that arguably plays a canonizing role in current mainstream philosophy: 
Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one’s own mind? (Steup 2005)
What guidance can we draw from the discipline thus defined for dealing with a “post-truth regime”? The first part of the definition concerns knowledge. It assigns epistemology the task of defining knowledge, and assumes that this definition must take the form of necessary and sufficient conditions (for something being knowledge). So we see a significant literature in mainstream epistemology discussing particular candidate sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and their counterexamples. A particularly thoroughly-explored candidate is that something is knowledge if it is a belief, and true and justified. But it is widely discussed that this definition is subject to counterexample (Gettier 1963). For instance, if one is driving along the highway and sees some barns in a field (which are in fact cardboard replicas of barns), and on that basis concludes that there are barns in the field (which there in fact are, but not positioned where one can see them), such a belief is both true and justified, but we would not want to call it knowledge (Goldman 1976).
But why is it useful for philosophers to seek necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge? Presumably in order to enable human beings to recognise instances of knowledge when we manage to produce them (and the debate’s structure presupposes without argument that this recognition will be essentially the same whether it concerns fake/real barns or, say, new particles in quantum physics, or a politician’s true intentions). But how do we produce instances of knowledge? Little explicit guidance is given on this. One might argue that the second part of the definition, concerning justification, addresses this. Justification is often understood broadly as any process of supporting belief with reasoned arguments and evidence. Yet we have seen that one of the post-truth regime’s most characteristic features is that talking points continue to be repeated after reasoned arguments and evidence have been presented against them, and are nonetheless avidly embraced. Against this behaviour, studies of rational justification would appear to be of little help.
It’s also worth noting that this disciplinary definition makes no mention of people. Although knowledge is discussed, knowers are not – except right at the end of the quote, where a (single) “mind” is invoked. This disembodiment and methodological individualism in epistemology is a legacy of modern (i.e. post-Cartesian) philosophy, and it points to further ways in which epistemology so characterised cannot help us to confront the current post-truth regime. The regime’s savvy manipulation of people’s emotions for epistemic victory in the public arena lies outside the purview of this disciplinary definition because the definition says nothing about emotions, and because it says nothing about the public arena. One dimension of human emotion which it would be particularly useful to consider epistemologically in the light of the post-truth regime is human motivation, since one of the regime’s salient features is that people no longer seem to care about getting things right. Why do they not care about something that we intellectuals consider to be so important? Is there anything that could be done to encourage them to care? And why should we attempt to change this, exactly?
By contrast to this mainstream characterisation of epistemology, then, we need to know more than just what knowledge is. We also need guidance on how to find and keep it, how to call out its many pretenders, and on how to encourage people who are currently neglectful to care about it. In short, as one public commentator has quipped: What is the opposite of post-truth? It’s not as simple as “the facts” (Poole 2017).
Peirce’s Epistemology
We will see that, by contrast, Peirce’s characterisation of truth and knowledge is public, and it addresses the motivational side of epistemology and the lived context of truth-seeking.
	Developing his ideas shortly after Darwin’s landmark Origin of Species, Peirce pursued a consciously naturalistic approach to epistemology, examining truth-seeking’s use in the life of human beings as biological organisms making their way in a complex and often dangerous world. What understandings might flow from that? Firstly, Peirce suggested certain definitions of belief and doubt. Peirce defines belief as habit. Belief is a settled state where one knows how to act in a given respect. For instance, if one believes that one’s car is in good working order, then one will reliably get in and turn the key in order to go somewhere. This settled state feels comfortable to the human organism. Peirce then defines doubt as missing, or disrupted habit. This is an unsettled state in which one no longer knows how to act in a given respect. This state is intrinsically irritating to human beings, and we naturally (have evolved to) seek to resolve this mental irritation, just as we naturally scratch our physical itches. In this way, the effect of doubt on us is more immediate than that of belief.
These definitions lead Peirce to distinguish two importantly different kinds of doubt. The first Peirce calls genuine or “living” doubt. This can be recognised in that it actually disrupts action. An example is a sudden realisation that I cannot remember locking my car before leaving it parked in the street, where the associated concern that my car might be stolen will not leave me in peace until I go and check. The second kind of doubt Peirce calls pretend or “paper” doubt. This doubt does not actually disrupt action. Examples include classical scenarios of “extreme” Cartesian scepticism, for instance: “Could there be an evil demon producing every one of my “experiences” for me?”; “Could the entire world have been created only 5 minutes ago, including all of my memories?” If the entire world were created only 5 minutes ago, along with all my memories, what would I do differently? This is not clear. Peirce advises that concerning oneself too much with such questions, insofar as one is not moved to act on them in any way, is actually intellectually corrosive.
This analysis leads Peirce to reject a certain foundationalism – which he diagnoses as Cartesian – that has been highly influential in mainstream philosophy. Thus Moritz Schlick, although a member of the positivist Vienna Circle and thus an avowed naturalist, famously wrote:
All important attempts at establishing a theory of knowledge grow out of the problem concerning the certainty of human knowl​edge. And this problem in turn originates in the wish for absolute certainty. (Schlick 1934, p. 207)
Peirce claims that this “quest for certainty” is an antinaturalistic and damaging illusion, due to a peculiar feature of truth. Although often greatly desired, truth is opaque to us in that we can never know for sure that we have it, and there is no criterion by which we can recognise it. For our methods of inquiry themselves are part of what we must correct as inquiry develops. Putting one’s belief-deriving method into the epistemological frame along with one’s beliefs has already been noted as characteristic of pragmatist epistemology. In my view, it is surprising that other epistemologies have not attended to this matter as it is obvious in our history that, as Peirce puts it, “each chief step in science has been a lesson in logic” (Peirce 1877, p. 1).
If truth is opaque, then we cannot take it as an explicit goal. So what should we search for? What motivates us to inquire? Merely this: avoiding the intrinsic irritation of doubt. Peirce claims, “The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.” (Peirce 1877, p. 3). Peirce calls this goal the “settlement of opinion”, or (as his paper title says) “the fixation of belief”. He notes that this process is what we must call inquiry, for want of other options, although in some cases this designation is “not very apt”. So how do we fix our beliefs (as we in fact do, every day)? Peirce claims that there are four basic methods. 
	The first is the method of tenacity. Here you personally decide what you want to believe. You dwell on and “constantly reiterate” to yourself that belief, and if anyone offers reasoned argument or evidence against it, you refuse to consider it. We may not like to admit it, but this method is used by all of us in many real-life situations. Peirce gives an example that is still strikingly relevant today, concerning free-trade (i.e. globalisation):
I remember once being entreated not to read a certain newspaper lest it might change my opinion upon free-trade […]You might […] if you read this paper, be led to believe in protection. But you admit that free-trade is the true doctrine; and you do not wish to believe what is not true. (Peirce 1877, p. 7)
The method has significant advantages in situations where decisiveness is wanted. If you are a soldier serving in Iraq, for instance, then to decide never to question the rightness of your country’s declaring war on Iraq might literally keep you alive. Yet the method also creates problems, since human beings are social creatures with a common “form of life”, so that we naturally influence each other’s beliefs. So, Peirce claims, this method will not eliminate all your doubt unless there is something wrong with you:
The man who adopts [the method] will find that other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief. This conception, that another man's thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one's own, is a distinctly new step, and a highly important one. It arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species. Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other's opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community. (Peirce 1877, p. 7)
In short, the method of tenacity is internally unstable and leads on naturally to the next method.
The second method is the method of authority. Here you get some group of people to fix your belief for you. Human history has not lacked examples of organizations willing to assume such a role, from churches, to political parties, to professional guilds. In order to enforce the preferred beliefs, such institutions must take certain steps. They will “reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed” (Peirce 1877, p 8). So, for instance, in the medieval period, the Christian Bible served across Western Europe as an ultimate authority for belief, and, in 1277, the Bishop of Paris, incensed by philosophical discussions taking place in the University of Paris, banned 217 propositions!​[2]​
Peirce notes that this method has “immeasurable mental and moral superiority” over the previous one, and consequently it produces a marvellous stability in society. Yet it too has serious problems. As a method of “fixing belief” so that people are not disturbed by doubt’s intrinsic irritation, it never quite lasts. No matter how powerfully a belief-system is enforced, there will always be some people who notice a certain randomness in the way that the intellectual leaders have formed the group’s beliefs, and this raises genuine doubt in their minds concerning those beliefs:
[…] in the most priest-ridden states some individuals will be found who are raised above that condition. These men possess a wider sort of social feeling; they see that men in other countries and in other ages have held to very different doctrines from those which they themselves have been brought up to believe; and they cannot help seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been taught as they have […] that has caused them to believe as they do […] Nor can their candour resist the reflection that there is no reason to rate their own views at a higher value than those of other nations and other centuries; thus giving rise to doubts in their minds (Peirce 1877, p. 8).
In short, the method of authority is internally unstable and leads on naturally to the next method.
The third method is the a priori method, whereby the kinds of people who naturally resist having their opinions fixed arbitrarily by institutions will seek a “new method of settling opinions…that shall not only produce an impulse to believe, but shall also decide what proposition it is which is to be believed” (Peirce 1877, p. 9). Through discussion, such people decide on the beliefs that seem to them most “agreeable to reason”. Of course, this method has been very popular with philosophers. And, once again, it is greatly intellectually superior to what went before, since for the first time reasoning is employed in deciding what to believe. Yet Peirce claims that this is actually the worst method of all for fixing belief! For it exposes our beliefs to the vagaries of individual taste and fashion, making them fluctuate wildly:
metaphysicians have never come to any fixed agreement, but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times to the latest […] (Peirce 1877, p. 9)
This method’s methodological individualism also means that each individual’s false assumptions and epistemic blind-spots are never corrected. So if we perform a scientific induction over this method, we are forced to conclude that it really doesn’t work.
Finally, we come to the method that Peirce prefers – the method of science. Peirce here understands “science” extremely broadly. He explains the method as a public investigation (open to any interested parties) that is organised around a particular hypothesis:
Its fundamental hypothesis […] There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any [person], if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion. (Peirce 1877, p. 11)
Peirce claims that only in this method does a full-blooded concept of truth first emerge, since only under this method is there a distinction between a “right” and “wrong” way of inquiring:
This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way. If I adopt the method of tenacity, and shut myself out from all influences, whatever I think necessary to doing this, is necessary according to that method. So with the method of authority: the state may try to put down heresy by means which, from a scientific point of view, seem very ill-calculated to accomplish its purposes; but the only test on that method is what the state thinks […] So with the a priori method. The very essence of it is to think as one is inclined to think […] But with the scientific method […]the test of whether I am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the application of the method. Hence it is that bad reasoning as well as good reasoning is possible […] (Peirce 1877, p. 11)
Implicit here is the reason why Peirce thinks the method of science is superior to all the others at fixing belief: only in this method does the reappearance of doubt not produce a breakdown in the method itself, but rather is folded back into the method and used as fuel for self-correction.
We’ve seen that only the method of science allows an object entirely independent of human thought, which it is appropriate to call reality, to determine what our beliefs should be. But that reality cannot be approached directly since, as noted, truth is opaque to us. So how is Peirce, as a naturalist pragmatist epistemologist who wants to locate his theory of inquiry in human lived context, to give an account of such an opaque concept? Ingeniously, he “triangulates” truth via the community of inquiry, writing famously in his paper “How to Make our Ideas Clear” that, “the opinion that would be agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth” (Peirce 1931-1958). This definition of truth is often summarised in the slogan: Truth is the end of inquiry. It’s important to note that this is not “end” in the sense of finish: some utopian future time where all questions are settled. It is “end” in the teleological sense of aim or goal. 
Meanwhile, a commitment to fallibilism is “operationalized” in the way Peirce defines the community of inquiry as containing indefinitely many inquirers and stretching across indefinite time. This infinite scope has been criticized as an idealization that renders truth unattainable, and engages in excessive optimism (how do we know there will be such a thing?) (See for instance Russell 1939; Rorty 1995). Yet every argument that Peirce can never know that there is an end of inquiry is equally an argument that the sceptic can never know that there isn’t. We just don’t know. That is the human condition. It is worth noting how the infinite framework elegantly allows that no matter how wide a consensus exists on a given belief, it is always possible that another inquirer will come along, at a later time, and manage to overturn it. Thus, we might say that in Peirce’s epistemology: The solution to poor opinions is more opinions (and, given truth’s opacity, there can be no other solution). 
I shall now argue that this philosophy, with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare combination of strong realism and contrite fallibilism, points towards ways that we might weather the epistemic storms of our current socio-political regime, and perhaps even come to see them as inevitable in our intellectual and political development.
Analysis of the Post-Truth Regime
The first thing to note is that under the Peircean epistemology, labelling a set of human behaviours “post-truth” doesn’t make much sense. As the postulated end of inquiry, truth comes “post-” everything else in human discourse. Yet there is much in Peirce’s framework that we can make use of to discuss our current regime. 
We saw that one characteristic (and disturbing) phenomenon of the regime is a repetition of talking points that seems immune to counter-evidence or logical argument. In at least some respects, this fits squarely with Peirce’s method of tenacity. We saw Peirce noting that a key part of practicing this method is reiterating to oneself the beliefs one wishes to hold. (At this point it might be interesting to ask why the talking points need to be repeated over and over. It seems as though a concerted effort is required to block out something further that exists in oneself, such as some potential for rational reflection perhaps.) Yet the fit between these practices of repeating talking points and Peirce’s method of tenacity is not quite exact, because the practices seem to be to some degree communal, forming public crowds that frequently behave like mobs (Ronson 2015). In its group character, then, the behaviour seems to fall under the method of authority. And with respect to this method also, we saw Peirce noting that repetition of the belief (this time by relevant institutions) was an important feature. Yet, at the same time, the behaviour lacks much of the stability in belief for which Peirce praised the method of authority – noting that “except the geological epochs, there are no periods of time so vast as those which are measured by some of [the] organized faiths” (Peirce 1877, p. 9). In its ever-shifting kaleidoscope quality, whereby the current media landscape seems comprised of countless incompatible perspectives at war with one another, the current regime also seems to resemble Peirce’s a priori method, in its giving over of our beliefs to taste, fashion and a spurious consistency largely untried by real experience with the beliefs’ objects.
   What all of these methods (and, correspondingly, our current regime) lack is humble deference to an object that is external to human opinion – deference that naturally leads one to seek further information about that object before behaving as if one has certainty about it. Such arrogant assumed certainty is a dismaying feature of our current regime. In that sense, our current situation, in its heady mix of Peirce’s first three methods, might be best described as a degeneration to a pre-truth scenario. It’s worth noting again that this state of affairs is something that mainstream epistemology cannot see. With its abstracted, non-human perspective granting its concept of knowledge a spurious universality, it cannot see that it takes a great deal of philosophical work, and certain social structures, to even get onto the page of developing a concept of truth, and so beginning to inquire. Philosophers such as Brandom and Habermas have done much useful work lately in charting this “normative pragmatics” underlying our assertions of truth. But Peirce did valuable work much earlier in showing that there are “assumptions involved in the logical question” (Peirce 1877, p. 5).
Analysis of Ourselves
By “ourselves” here I mean those of us concerned enough about the current regime to write and read papers about it, such as this esteemed volume. Many Western intellectuals proudly self-conceive as living in a “scientific age”. But do we practice the method of science, as Peirce described it? I shall now make some suggestions – offered in the spirit of Peircean fallibilism – about some ways in which we may currently fall short. 
1) We have a strong tendency to treat the misbehavior of governments as a harbinger of epistemic doom. In this respect, we arguably remain trapped in the authoritarian modes of thinking that Peirce identified with the medieval age, although modernity is increasingly quickening around us in information-sharing practices that transgress national and institutional boundaries in order to deliver mutual aid (Shirky 2009). The epistemic space is ours by professional designation, if not always in practice. How much are we willing to communicate with one another across the boundaries of powerful institutions and genuinely inquire together, in order to claim that space and show epistemic “tyrants”, by way of example, that there is another path to fix belief?
2) Conversely, we have a strong tendency to treat ourselves as the epistemic saviours of the rest of humanity, in the sense of imagining that ordinary people should simply listen to our expertise, and use it, for their own good. In this respect, we arguably risk practicing the method of authority again – this time with ourselves at the head of belief-fixing institutions. Here it would be helpful to take an honest look at our own guild behavior and careerism. (Consider our systems of ranking ourselves, for instance.)
3) We don’t want to engage with “those people”, with their “deplorable” views. But don’t we believe in rational argument?
Weathering the Epistemic Storm
The post-truth regime challenges us academics to return to the vital question: Why do we care about truth? (Even: do we care about truth? And we need to be rigorously honest here.) Today’s academics, in their highly specialised institutional setting with its relative freedom to write and think, also exist in a specialized community with its own assumptions. We have embraced this institutional isolation extremely uncritically (for an excellent recent critique, see Frodeman and Briggle 2016). Of course, who doesn’t want as much paid time as possible to do very important work? But in so doing, we too have created an environment where we never have to genuinely engage with the many ordinary people who, it would appear, have been developing genuine (“living”) doubts on a number of the beliefs that we have been taking for granted (liberalism being one key example, the value of a University education being another). 
If we are regressing to something of a “pre-truth regime” in the West – and I have given some reasons to suppose that we are – we might like to look correspondingly backwards in philosophical history for advice. I believe that there are some useful resources for our current discussion in Plato. Plato came to maturity in a world that was (for obvious reasons) “pre-Academic”. Plato scholar Charles Griswold has offered useful insights into what Plato might have to teach us today in a discussion of Plato’s use of dialogue in his philosophy, a choice that Griswold argues was not merely ornamental, but epistemological. The reason, he suggests, is that Plato himself was confronting a pre-truth regime, against which discursive reasoning (i.e. non-dialectical philosophy) is largely ineffective. In such a context, he notes: 
The real debate is not between the proponents of dialectic and those of nondialectical epistemology, but between the dialecticians and critics of philosophizing, or “reason-giving” as such. (Griswold 1988, p. 151) 
Griswold’s important insight is that the argument between reason-giving as such and its enemies cannot be settled nondialectically. He claims, “[i]t is not possible to successfully attack or defend philosophy directly” (Griswold 1988, p. 154), since to argue against philosophy is already unavoidably to engage in it. (Richard Rorty, 1982, has put the same point, but with respect to attacking rather than defending philosophy, by claiming that “edifying” philosophers such as himself have no view.)
  This essential dialectic character means that the defence of philosophy cannot be successfully constructed in the absence of fundamental objections to philosophy (Griswold 1988, p. 156). Here epistemologists have to back away from disputes between positions, which beg the question emptily in favour of doing philosophy, since only a philosopher can frame a position, to disputes between persons, which do not so beg the question, since philosophy is something that persons may or may not choose to engage in. Griswold claims that such conversations between persons who do and persons who do not choose to engage in philosophy are always occasional, never conclusive, never ending. Yet they are vital. Thus “[t]he origination of philosophy itself out of the medium of opinion is the most comprehensive theme in Plato's dialogues” (Griswold 1988, p. 153). Philosophical rhetoric is pedagogical in its original etymology of “leading the soul”. We’ve seen how, in our current regime, the repetition of the talking points is somewhat obsessive, as if something else is being prevented from happening. Perhaps, then, a useful service for a 21st century epistemologist might consist in leading souls away from such repetition. (And this is surely just one of many possible approaches.)
We have seen that in this human life truth is unavoidably opaque to us. We cannot prove that it even exists – particularly to those profiting by (or ensnared in) a pre-truth regime. But, Griswold notes, we can learn ourselves, and we can help and encourage others to learn. The deed of learning is the ultimate proof that truth exists. In this way, philosophical discourse exhibits irony – but not of the easily dismissive Rortyan kind. This paper has been written in the pragmatist belief that in order to confront the current regime, we professional thinkers and writers would do well to pay more attention to our own actions. This includes listening well to those with contrary opinions – even those who promote them most aggressively – since, in the epistemic as opposed to the political space, as ever, “the [only] solution to poor opinions is more opinions.”
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^1	  In 2016 Professor George Yancy of Emory University received a torrent of hate mail for comments he made in his research area of philosophy of race: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/the-perils-of-being-a-black-philosopher/. A graduate student instructor at Marquette University was targeted for abuse by a professor in her own institution for remarks in the classroom concerning sexual orientation, resulting in her personal details, such as her home address, being made public: http://dailynous.com/2017/05/05/judge-upholds-marquettes-suspension-prof-smeared-philosophy-phd-student/ 
^2	  These included, That the absolutely impossible cannot be done by God, That the world is eternal [i.e. not created as the Bible says], and That the only wise men of the world are philosophers (!)
